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Book Review 
Rockwell F. Clancy, Towards a Political Anthropology in 
the Work of Gilles Deleuze: Psychoanalysis and Anglo-
American Literature (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 
2015). 
At times, Deleuze scholars seem to be proverbial blind men and women 
describing an elephant. That’s not a bad thing, nor should it be unexpected. 
Deleuze was a master at integrating multiple sources into his thought, and if 
you pursue the network of associations related to any one source, almost 
inevitably you are forced to deal with all the others. Deleuze has been viewed 
from the vantage of a number of philosophers, including his favorites—
Nietzsche, Spinoza, Bergson and Hume—but also his enemies, such as Kant 
and Hegel. Clancy has chosen to approach Deleuze via a writer most would 
consider marginal to his enterprise: D. H. Lawrence. Through careful readings 
of Lawrence and Deleuze, Clancy manages to build a strong case for 
Lawrence as one of Deleuze’s key influences, and in the process, he develops 
an account of Deleuzian politics that grants philosophy and the arts a central 
role in inventing new modes of existence and forming a viable future 
collectivity. 
 The primary texts of Lawrence in Clancy’s discussion are not the novels 
or poems, but Lawrence’s two critiques of psychoanalysis—Psychoanalysis and 
the Unconscious (1921) and Fantasia of the Unconscious (1922)—as well as his 
Studies in Classic American Literature (1923). In Lawrence’s counter-theory to 
psychoanalysis, which Lawrence playfully calls “pollyanalytics,” Clancy 
finds a precursor to the schizoanalysis of Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus 
(1972). As Clancy skillfully shows, Lawrence, like Deleuze and Guattari, 
conceives of the unconscious in terms not of a psychic lack but of a positive 
somatic drive akin to Nietzsche’s will to power or Spinoza’s conatus. 
Lawrence also shares Deleuze and Guattari’s view that the Oedipus complex, 
though real, is not universal, but rather the symptom of a modern Western 
malaise. Finally, Lawrence sees literature as a source of insight for 
psychoanalysis rather than a symptom of neurosis, and in a similar fashion 
Deleuze and Guattari approach literature and philosophy as creative means 
of going beyond psychoanalysis to invent new ways of living. In Lawrence’s 
Studies in Classic American Literature, Clancy discerns not simply a source for 
Deleuze’s understanding of Anglo-American literature, but also a Spinozistic 
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conception of mind, body and community in accord with Deleuze’s 
philosophy, a “materialist-parallelist perspective” that understands 
“individuals as ‘modes’ (aggregates of thoughts, perceptions, and feelings), 
communities as larger, further reaching modes, and the relations between 
them in terms of sympathy (shared thoughts, perceptions and feelings)” (78). 
 Clancy devotes his first chapter to Lawrence’s “pollyanalytics,” and his 
second to Lawrence’s Studies in Classic American Literature. The ensuing two 
chapters examine the Deleuzian counterparts to these texts. In the third 
chapter, Clancy offers an extended and illuminating reading of Anti-Oedipus, 
showing the ways in which Deleuze and Guattari echo Lawrence’s critique of 
psychoanalysis and extend the implications of that critique by detailing its 
Spinozistic characteristics and drawing out its political ramifications. In the 
fourth chapter, Clancy turns to Deleuze and Parnet’s Dialogues (1977), 
specifically to the section titled “On the Superiority of Anglo-American 
Literature.” Here, Clancy makes the ingenious argument that Deleuze treats 
“Anglo-American literature” not as a body of texts but as a philosophical 
concept, which has as its antithesis “Franco-Germanic literature.” According 
to this reading, the heterogeneous elements of Dialogues’ Anglo-American 
Literature section, many of which seem to have nothing to do with literature, 
are all constituents of the concept of Anglo-American literature. What seem 
to be digressive asides on Hume, Spinoza and the Stoics are actually 
specifications of features of this concept—that relations are external to their 
terms (Hume), that bodies are configurations of speeds and affects (Spinoza), 
and that sets of relations and configurations of bodies constitute events (the 
Stoics). Thus, Deleuze’s “praise for Anglo-American literature concerns the 
metaphysical commitments it implies,” commitments in accord with those of 
Anti-Oedipus’s “model of the body without organs and a legitimate 
understanding of the syntheses of the unconscious, which give rise to a 
different understanding of individuals, community, and relations between 
them” (213). 
 In his final two chapters, Clancy elaborates on his understanding of 
Deleuze’s politics by discussing the role of philosophy and the arts in 
inventing a people to come. Chapter Five concentrates on Deleuze and 
Guattari’s critique of opinion in What Is Philosophy? (1992), a critique that has 
been largely unexamined by other commentators and here undergoes 
masterful analysis. Clancy shows that Deleuze and Guattari approach the 
venerable philosophical problem of doxa via the concept of chaos. Here, once 
again, Deleuze and Guattari find inspiration for their analysis in Lawrence, 
whose brief essay “Chaos in Poetry” conceives of poetry as a force that rips 
holes in the umbrella of opinion that shields us from chaos. Deleuze and 
Guattari argue that implicit in traditional notions of opinion are the existence 
of discrete human subjects, stable world objects, and common perceptions 
and feelings among subjects that allow them to reach consensus and thereby 
form a community of reasonable individuals. For such individuals, chaos is 
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the enemy, in that it undermines the certainties of an unchanging world. By 
contrast, Deleuze and Guattari regard chaos as an uneasy ally, a disruptive 
force that allows philosophy and art to undo received opinion and fashion 
new modes of existence. Philosophy and art establish “relations of sympathy, 
cultivating shared thoughts, perceptions and feelings,” but those relations 
and shared thoughts, perceptions and feelings are formative elements of the 
metamorphic processes that bring into existence subjects, world objects and 
communities, not secondary products of fully-formed entities in a stable 
world. “Unlike opinion,” Clancy specifies, “the relation by which philosophy 
and art bring order to chaos is conceived as extrinsic and variable, determined 
by chance encounters. The correspondences established determine the nature 
of subjectivity and the kinds of relations into which subjects enter, which in 
turn determine the inter-subjective community formed as a result” (255-6). 
 What such an inter-subjective community might be is the subject of 
Clancy’s final chapter. Toward the end of his life, Deleuze spoke often of the 
necessity of inventing a “people to come,” and through a close reading of 
three essays from Deleuze’s last book, Essays Critical and Clinical (1993), 
Clancy develops an insightful explanation of what Deleuze meant by this 
phrase. Clancy sees in Deleuze’s essay on Lawrence’s Apocalypse an 
articulation of the basic political problem Deleuze addresses: how may we 
avoid the extremes of an inclusive universalism, whereby individuals become 
interchangeable constituents of a pan-species mass, and an exclusive 
particularism, whereby individuals and groups define themselves through 
their agonistic opposition to the other? In Deleuze’s essay on T. E. Lawrence’s 
Seven Pillars of Wisdom, Clancy discerns a partial answer to this question in 
Deleuze’s remarks on Lawrence’s complex relationship with the Arabs he 
leads in guerrilla warfare. But it is only in Deleuze’s essay on Walt Whitman 
that Clancy finds a full response to this question. For Deleuze, Whitman’s 
notions of camaraderie, the open road and Unionism constitute the 
fundamental principles necessary for the formation of a people to come, 
principles Clancy identifies as those of an inclusive particularism. In this 
view, relations among humans are “singular and variable rather than 
universal and fixed” (293), created rather than given, and it is through 
philosophy and art that bonds of sympathy are forged via the production of 
shared thoughts, perceptions and feelings, which are mutually constitutive of 
individuals and a community that organizes heterogeneous elements without 
reducing them to a homogeneous collectivity. 
 Clancy’s ultimate goal is to delineate the contours of a “political 
anthropology” in Deleuze. In Clancy’s analysis, the liberal tradition in 
political philosophy promotes a neutral tolerance of citizens’ diverse moral 
and religious views, yet such neutrality “implies a conception of human 
nature as rational, disinterested, and risk averse” (19). The corrective to 
liberalism, Clancy argues, is not to abandon claims to the existence of a 
knowable human nature, but to take up the task of philosophical 
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anthropology and develop an alternative conception of human nature. This is 
precisely what Deleuze does, Clancy claims. He offers “a philosophical 
anthropology where the mind is not given priority over the body, individuals 
are conceived as unique sets of relations—what Spinoza calls ‘bodies’—
community is conceived as wider, further reaching sets of relations than 
individuals, and the basis of relations between individuals and community is 
sympathy—such that the goal of political activity consists in the production 
of shared thoughts, perceptions, and feelings” (29). 
 This is an ambitious book that makes significant contributions to 
Deleuze studies. Clancy’s advocacy of a Deleuzian political anthropology 
offers a provocative alternative to previous accounts of Deleuze’s political 
philosophy, especially in its valorization of the arts as primary forces in the 
creation of a viable collectivity. Clancy’s exposition of Lawrence’s critical 
works, especially his books on psychoanalysis, brings to the fore texts that 
have been ignored by Deleuze scholars, and the parallels he draws between 
Lawrence and Deleuze/Guattari are striking. Readers will have to decide for 
themselves to what extent the parallels are signs of Lawrence’s influence on 
his successors or a mere confluence of interests. There is no doubt that 
Lawrence is the primary source of Deleuze’s understanding of Anglo-
American literature in general and Whitman in particular. But one might well 
argue that Deleuze and Guattari developed their critique of psychoanalysis 
independently of Lawrence and simply saw in him a welcome ally in their 
struggle against the pieties of the Oedipus complex. Whether the Lawrence-
Deleuze/Guattari connection constitutes influence or a confluence of interest, 
however, is of little moment. What counts is the connection itself, which in 
Clancy’s treatment gives rise to an original and compelling reading of 
Deleuze and Guattari, one that deserves the serious attention of everyone in 
the field. 
Ronald Bogue 
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